UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-2003

Cost management preferences of small restaurant firms
Hessun (Amy) Kim
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Kim, Hessun (Amy), "Cost management preferences of small restaurant firms" (2003). UNLV
Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 1535.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/7jh2-17zz

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

by

Heesun (Amy) Kim
BadœkMofAds
Sogang University, Seoul, Kcwnea
1997

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

M aster of Science Degree
William F. H arrah College of Hotel Administration

G raduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 2003

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI N um ber: 1416224

Copyright 2003 by
Kim, Hessun (Amy)

All rights reserved.

UMI
UMI Microform 1416224
Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Thesis Approval
The Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

May

,20 03

The Thesis prepared by
Heesun Amy Kim
Entitled
Cost Management Preferences of Small Restaurant Firms

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

’h ,
E za M z z 'z z afz'o zz C a z z z a z z t t e e C E a z z '

)e a z t o f tE e G ra d z z a te C o E e g e

Graduate CoEege EacuEy Represetztahue

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
Cost Management Preferences
of Small Restaurant Firms
by
Heesim (Amy) Kim
Dr. Michael Dalbor, Examinadon Committee Chair
Processor of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The purpose o f this study is to test cost management preferences o f small restaurant
6rms. It attempts to identify v teth er managers of small restaurant 6rms behave
diSerently depending on the level of conflict as noted by agency theory and expense
preference theory.
Data hom 87 private small restaurant Grms were used. Cost of doing business, size of
staff and hve accounting ratios (ROE, ROA, Profit Margin, Financial Leverage and Asset
Utilization) were used as dependent variables. Three independent variables, type of
management, family-owned factor and ownership percentage were used as the sources of
variance. The results 6om the analysis of variance and linear regression show support for
the research hypotheses that small restaurant hrms are operated diSerently depending on
the level of conflict
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study
The major purpose o f this paper is to test cost management preferences of restaurant
Gims usiog agency theory. It is expected that costs are controlled diGerently by
managas depending on the degree o f conflict between the agent (managers) and the
principal(s) (owners).

Background of the study
The collapse of Enron (NYSE: ENE), once the seventh largest Grm in America, is
known as the largest corporate failure ever, throwing thousands of employees out of work
and leaving Gieir retirement accounts worthless. This incident not only caused investors
to lose billions of dollars but also raised quesGons about business ethics, which will
continue to affect overall investor conGdence. Given the complexity of this case, many
diGerent issues and problems such as accounting pracGces, poliGcal influence, and
business ethics have been raised and are currently being invesGgated. However, among
the many core reasons that contribute to this chaos, it can be said that the "conflict of
interest" issue between managers and owners played a major role in the company's
failure.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The issue of conflict between manag«"s and owners has been examined by numerous
studies in previous literature based on what is called agaicy theory, discussed by Jensen
and Meckling (1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship
is deGned as a contractual relaGonship under which one or more persons (the principal)
engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf^ which
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agenL In this relaGonship the
"conflict of interest" between managers and owners arises due to the Gict that Giere is a
separaGon between ownership and maoagonent. Under the behavioral assumpGon that
all individuals are assumed to choose acGons that maximize their own personal wel&re,
there is good reason to believe that the agent (manager) will not always act in the best
interests of the principal (owner/shareholders).
Many ways have been proposed to miGgate the conflict that occurs in this
relaGonship. One of the popular ways that has been suggested is to increase the
proporGons of stocks owned by managers. Hence, many studies (RozeG^ 1982; Kim &
Sorensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; Kim et al., 1988; Hudson et al., 1992; Gu & Qian,
1999) relating managerial ownership and company performance have been completed
with some studies finding a signiGcant relaGonship and others not Gnding that result
The idea of testing the relaGonship between managenal ownership (usually measured
by the percentage of stock held by management) and company performances (usually
measured by stock return, dividend policy, and accounting raGos) is to test the hypothesis
that managerial ownership will have a posiGve relaGonship with company performance
because increasing managerial ownership is expected to play a posiGve role in miGgating
the conflict (mangers will act like owners). This ownership will therefore reduce agency
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cost, which will, in turn, lower the degree of potential decrease in Grm value. However,
the majonty of the literature, vdiich focuses on the relationship between the level of
monitorii^ (for example, number of board meetings) or incenGves (for example, stock
opGons, CEO compensaGon, performance plans and so forth.) and how this afkcts
company performance (for example, dividend policy, proGt raGos, stock prices) only
provides indirect evidence of the existence of the relationship. These researchers mainly
focused on examining the overall existence of the agency relaGonship between the agent
and the owner, rather Gian focusing on which Grm level variables are controGed
diSerenGy by managers or how much the actual agency costs are. This is because there
is no public company that is 100 percent owned and managed by one person. The use of
Giese data limits the complete comparison between every level of ownership structure in
■

which a Grm is 100 percent owned and managed by a single individual (no agency cost
occurs) and in vhich a Grm is operated by a manager with no equity in the Grm
(manager's pay is completely independent of Grm performance) and the performance of
these Grms. This explains why the actual measurement of the principal variable of
interest and agency costs has lagged behind (Ang et al., 2000). As Jensen and Meckling
(1976) noted in their paper, only in the case where a Grm is 100 percent owned and
managed by a person will there be no agency costs.
Different Gom previous research, this paper will attempt to identify the direct Grm
level cost variables, which are assumed to be controlled differenüy by managers
depending on their ownership structure. The major intenGon of this paper is to identify
the actual decision-making behavior of the managers of diGerent ownership structures
rather than testing the overall existence of the agency relaGonship. In order to carry this
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out, this p^ier wül use non-publicly traded small company data, Wiich are provided by
the Federal Reserve Board in their "1998 Survey of Small Business Finances," especially
focusing on restaurant Grms. These data provide diGerent ownership structure companies
Gom 100 percent owner-managed company to Grms operated by mangers with no equity
and various ownership cases in between; therefore it will make it possible to clearly
discover which variables are treated difkrenGy by managers depending on the level of
conGicL The variables tested will be based on Gnancial statement infbrmaGon, which is
the initial source of measuring company performance. The selecGon of the variables wiU
be supported by past literature, which will be introduced in Chapter 2.

ContribuGons o f the Study
Although many studies have empincally tested the relaGonship between managenal
ownership and company performance, the results are inconclusive. Some studies (Kim et
al., 1988; Hudson et al., 1992) have found a sigiGGcant relaGonship, whereas others
(RozeG^ 1982; Tsetsekos & DeFusco, 1990) have failed to identify this relaGonship. By
providing addiGonal empincal evidence, this study will also contribute to identifying the
agency relaGonship focusing on the Grm's manager and owner relaGonship.
As menGoned above, the m ^onty o f the existing literature has focused on testing
agency theory by examining the effects of monitoring or incenGves on the value of the
Grm and therefore, only implying the existence o f the relaGonship rather than calculating
the actual agency cost or identifying the actual variables that are controlled differenGy
depending on the level of conflict between the agent and the principal. In this study, the
attempt to identify the actual variables will not only provide more direct evidence of the
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relationship but also, by using private small company data, it will contribute in
identifying some of the firm level variables which are controlled differenGy depending on
managerial ownership structure. Identifying these variables will help recognize the
decision-making behavior of managers of different ownership structures.
Despite the expansion o f the mulG-unit chain restaurants, it is a well-known 6 c t that
Gie restaurant industry is still dominated by the mom-and-pop independent restaurants.
Accordh% to Gie 1995 Department of Commerce's Census, siigle-establishment
restaurants make up 62 percent of the total number o f restaurants in the United States
(U.S.). By using data of non-publicly traded small restaurant Grms, this study will add
onpirical evidence to the agency theory Gterature for the majority of these small
restaurant Grms in the U.S.

Limitations of the Study
The fbllowii^ are some of the m ^or limitaGons associated vdth this study:
1. Accuracy of this study is limited by the use o f secondary data;
2. Due to the size of the available samples, important factors such as type of
organizaGon, capital structure, and/or method o f accounting, and so Grth are not
considered in this study;
3. Only pnvately held companies are included in the study and therefore, results
may not be applicable to publicly traded companies;
4. The variables tested are also limited by the availability of the data provided;
5. The source of measurement error can occur due to the poor record-keeping
typical of small business and the tendency o f small-business owners to
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exercise Gexibility with respect to certain cost items (k r exanq)le,
raising/lowering expenses) (Ang et al., 2000); and,
6. The variables tested in the study only Meus on Grm level variables, which are
assumed to be directly controlled by managers.

DeGniGon of Terms
The terms used in this study are listed below.
1. Agency RelaGonship:
A contract under which one or more persons (the principal[s]) oigage another
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf vhich involves
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent
2. InteracGon:
In analysis-of-variance, a joint effect of the independent variables on the
dependent variable.
3. MainEfkct:
In analysis-of-variance, this is the efkct o f each o f the individual factors,
ignoring the other factors.
4. Other Income:
This term refers to any other business income the Grm may have had that was
not included in sales or gross receipts, such as federal or state gasoline tax
refunds or fuel tax credit or refunds.
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5. Outside-manager Grm:
A Grm in which an outside paid manager is responsible Mr day-to-day
operation of the Grm.
6. Owner-manager Grm:
A Grm in vdiich the primary owner is responsible Mr day-to-day operation of the
Grm.
7. Primary owner:
The owner who has the largest ownership share and Gill Gnancial decision
making authority.
8. Return on Assets (ROA):
Indicator of proGtabihty that is determined by dividing net income Mr the past
12 monMs by Mtal average assets. The result is shown as a percentage. ROA can
be decomposed into return on sales (net income/sales) mulGplied by asset
utilization (sales/assets).
9. Return on Equity (ROE):
This indicator o f proGtability is determined by dividing net income Mr the past
12 months by common stockholder equity (adjusted Mr stock splits). The
result is shown as a percentage. Investors use ROE as a measure o f how a
company is using its money.
ROE may be decomposed inM ROA mulGplied by Gnancial leverage (total
assets/total equity).
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10. Small Restaurant Firms:
A group of Grms deGned by primary SIC code 58 as commercial establishments
primarily engaged in the retail sales of prepared food and drinks for on-premise
or immediate consumpGon, which have fewer than 500 employees.
11. Total Cost of Doing Business:
This cost is the sum of "cost o f goods sold" and "selling and admirnstraGve
expenses." The cost of goods sold is the cost of purchasing materials and the
costs associated with preparing goods for sale during the last accounting year.
These costs include direct labor costs, cost of materials used to make the goods or
provide service and overhead costs (such as supervisory costs, suppGes, indirect
labor costs). Selling and administraGve expenses are addiGonal expenses that can
be incurred in operating a business. Examples of these expenses are rent or
property tax, insurance and depreciaGon of MciliGes, and interest paid on bonds,
notes and other loans.
12. Total Sales:
The amount is reMrred to as total sales less amount of returned merchandise.

Chapter Summary
This chzgrter introduced the purpose of the study along with limitaGons and
contribuGons of the study. Terminologies used in the study were also introduced. In the
next chapter, two major theones, agency theory and expense preference theory will be
introduced.
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CHAPTER!

LITERATURE REVIEW
IntroducGon
As mentioned in ch u ter one, much of the relevant literature idenGGes the existence
o f agency relaGonships by examining the relaGonship between morntoring/incoiGves and
company performance. In chfgyter two, the Gterature examining the iniGal confGict
between the agent and the owner wiG be discussed. Two theones wiH be introduced.
First, overaG agency theory wiG be examined. Second, expense-preference theory, vdGch
wiG be used to support the selecGon of cost variables, wiG be discussed. FinaGy, studies
of agency theory and issues in the restaurant industry wiG be introduced.

The Firm and Agency Theory
In order to understand the agency theory, it is necessary to Grst study the basic
concept of the Grm, since it serves as the basic setting for many agency relaGonships. In
this secGon agency theory vyiG be examined by discussing the following matters: 1) the
deGniGon o f the Grm; 2) agency theory and contracting; 3) the potential agency problems
and the cost that occurs Gom agency relaGonship; and, 4) ways to miGgate the conGict
and past empirical evidence.
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The Concept of the Firm
DeGning the concept of the Grm plays a large role in the study of agency relationship
because this concept serves as die nexus of the agency relationships among the various
participants within the Grm. One o f the earhest efMrts in deGning the concept of a Grm
was done by Coase (1937). In his paper called "The Nature of the Firmi," the idea of a
Grm was based on the economic idea of "subsGtuGon at the margin." It was ass«ted by
the author that Grms exist because there is a related cost, using the price mechanism, by
vhich resources are allocated in the econonuc system. In other words, some of the costs
that occur in a separate contract for each exchange transacGon, which takes place on a
market, can be saved by forming an orgarGzaGon (a Grm) and allowing some authority to
direct the resources (Coase, 1937).
Building on this work, a papo^ by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) deGnes a Grm as a
contractual structure with joint ir^ut(s) or team producGon. It was noted in their p^)er
that contractual structure arises as a means of enhancing efhcient orgarGzaGon, joint
input(s), or team producGotL Because it is possible to increase producGvity through
team-onented producGon and it is economical to estimate marginal producGvity, this
possibility leads to the contractual organizaGon of inputs, known as classical capitalist
Grms (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
Similar to the deGrGGon of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976)
also deGned a Grm based on the contracting relaGonship. The difkrence was that Jensen
and Meckling (1976) broadened their deGrGGon by expanding this relaGonship beyond
the joint producGon or team producGon to contracting relaGonships among individuals
(employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and so on.). It is noted in their paper that
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most organizations are simply legal Actions, which serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among individuals. These relationships include Arms, non-proAt
institutions and foundations, mutual organizations and insurance companies and co
operatives, some private clubs, and even governmental bodies (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
It is clear Aom these deAniGons that a "Arm" (orgarGzaGon) is a complex set of
contractual relaGonships between individuals, mainly to decrease transacGonal costs or
increase producGvity, thereby maximizing proAt. From this contractual relaGonship
arises the relaGrmship and conflict between the principal (owner) and the agent
(manager).
Aeencv Theory and ContracGne
Before examining agency relaGonships in detail, there is a need to examine the pnor
reason why the principal (owner) does not manage the Arm alone but instead hires
individuals (agents). In other words, why are all Arms not owner-managed? According
to Jensen and Meckling (1976) if a wholly owned Arm is managed by the owner, he will
make operating decisions that maxirrGze his utility. However, if Gie owner-manager sells
equity claims on the corporaGons, which are idenGcal to his own, agency costs will be
generated by the divergence between his interest and those o f the outside shareholders,
since he will then bear oiGy a AacGon of Gie costs of any non-pecuniary beneAts he takes
out in maximizing his own utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The pnce the shareholders
pay for shares will reAect the moiGtoring costs and the effect of the divergence between
the manager's interest and theirs. Nevertheless, the owner wiU And it desirable to bear
these costs, as long as the welfare beneAt he experiences Aom converting his claim on the
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Ann into general purchasing power is large enough to ofEset the cost (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
This relaGonship exists in all organizaGons between managers and owners,
shareholders and bondholders, between suppGers, employees, customers, and in all
cooperaGve efforts at every level o f management in Arms. AddiGonally, the relaGonship
exists in uinversiGes, mutual companies, cooperaGves, governmental authoriGes and
bureaus, unions, and relaGonships normally classiAed as agency relaGonships such as
those common in the performing arts and the market Mr real estate (Jensen and Meckling,
1976).
The basic conflict between the two parGes exists because as utility maximizers, there
is good reason M believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The confAct that arises in this contractual
relaGonship is based upon the assumpGon that all individuals are assumed to choose
acGons that maximize their own personal welfare (Bamea et al., 1985). An example of
this conAict may be that of debtholders (principal) and the stockholders (agent). A Arm
that has debt outstanding may have the incenGve to undertake relaGvely high-risk (xqrital
investment projects, even though such projects may reduce the overall market value of
the Arms. This situaGon is defined as the problem o f "asset subsGtuGon" where the
stockholders o f a corporaGon will prefer projects that enhance their own wealth and they
may select projects adverse to the interests of the Arm's debtholders (Emery & Finnerty,
1991).
Another example of this basic conflict can be the relaGonship of stockholders
(principals) and managers (agents). As menGoned in the work of Alchian and Demsetz
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(1972), some employees want to get paid without having to put forth effort This
problem of an agent putting forth less than full effort is referred to as "shirking." The
problems that occur Aom this relaGonship are further examined below. However,
although there are many agency relaGonships, it should be noted that this paper focuses
mainly on the problems that occur between the manager (agent) and the owner (principal)
o f a company. The reason is Giat the delegaGon of decision-making authority is an
essenGal feature of the modem corporaGon (Bamea et al., 1985) and the relaGonship
between the stockholders (owners) and the managers (agents) of a corporaGon Ats the
deAoiGon o f a pure agency relaGonship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Problems That Occur Aom Aeencv RelaGonship and Its Costs
Several problems can occur in the relaGonship between the agent and the principal.
As menGoned earlier, the basic assumpGon is Giat Gie agent will not always act to
maximize the welfare of the principal. One o f the major problems is called the moral
hazard problem. The problem of moral hazard arises whenever the agent has the ability
to take unobserved self-interested acGons that are cosGy to the principal. These acGons
include direct beneAts, such as the personal use of a company car or personal side trips
on company travel, and indirect beneAts such as an up-to-date ofBce décor. Thus, the
stockholders will suffer a loss in theA residual claim Aom these acGons. Another
problem that arises Aom this relaGonship is infbrmaGon asymmetry. This problem arises
because one party possesses more infbrmaGon than the other due to then posiGon. For
example, because managers control the Arm on a day-to-day perfbrmance, they are the
ones who posses the most inMrmaGon concerning the Arm's perfbrmance (accounting
infbrmaGon/audit). Most of this infbrmaGon is not given to the investors. Therefbre, a
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conflict arises between the new investors and existing stockholders. Other potential
agency problems include the impact of bankruptcy on stockholders as opposed to
employees and under-investment
In most of these agency relationships a cost is incurred due to the divergence between
the agent's decisions and those decisions that beneAt the principal. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) deAned this cost as the dollar equivalent o f the reduction in welfare experienced
by the principal as a result o f this divergaice and refer to this as the "residual loss."
Monitoring costs are also incurred to limit the acAviAes of the agenL In addiAon,
bonding costs are needed to guarantee that the agent will not take certain acAons that
would harm the principal. Overall, the authors deAne the agency cost as the sum oA 1)
the monitoring expenditures by the principals; 2) the bonding expenditures by the agent;
and 3) the residual loss. These costs will eventually lead to the decrease in Arm value.
Wavs to Mitigate This Conflict and Past Empirical Evidence
Many studies have proposed ways to miAgate the conflict between the agent
(manager) and the priiKâpal (owner). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) asserted that the
contractual structure arises as a means of enhancing efAcient organizaGon o f team
producGon. Thus, the ability to detect shirking among owners ofjoinGy used inputs in
team producGon is enhanced by this arrangement (detecGon costs are reduced) and the
discipline (by revision o f contracts) o f input owners (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
Another simple way to miGgate this conflict is to strengthen monitoring and bonding
acGviGes. This process may include auditing, formal control systems, budget restncGons,
and incenGve compensaGon systems (Kim, 1998). A major method proposed by Jensen
and Meckling (1976) included increasing managenal stock ownership or the proporGons
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of stocks owned by the management This method of miGgating agency problems has
been examined by researchers (Rozeff, 1982; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988;
Kim et aL, 1988; H nd^n et al., 1992; Gn and Qian, 1999) in difkrent industries and by
using difkrent company performance measurements.
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) Grst discussed the relaGonship between agency
costs and Gie degree o f inside ownership, many studies have examined how managerial
behavior difkrs with the degree o f inside ownership. Some researchers (Rozeff, 1982;
Kim & Sorensen, 1986) examined insider ownership and corporate policy regarding debt
and dividends and found that low insider ownership Grms are managed difkrenGy Aom
h%h insider ownership Grms (Kim et al., 1988). Others (Kim et al., 1988; Hudson et al.,
1992) researched the relaGonship between insider ownership and security/stock returns
and found that, on averzge, stock issued by corporaGons with high insider ownership
tends to ouQierAmn that of low insider ownership Grms (Kim et al., 1988). Also using
the Eamings/Price raGo and considering the size effect, it was kund that Grms with
higher inside ownership had higher return, but there was an inverse relaGonship between
size and return (Hudson etal., 1992).
In the hospitality literature Gu and Qian (1998) examined the relaGonship between
managerial ownership and Grm perfbrmance in the U.S. hotel industry using Gve
accounting raGos (return on assets, return on investment, return on equity, proGt margin,
and operating return) and stock return. For both casino and regular hotels combined,
managerial ownership was staGsGcally signiGcant fbr proGt margin, operating return, and
return on equity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
A previous thesis (Kim, 1998) also measured perfbrmance of U.S. restaurants using
seven accounting ratios (total asset turnover, operating efGciency ratio, net proGt margin,
operating return, return on assets, return on equity, and return on investment).
Examining whether the impact of managerial ownership on Grm perfbrmance is difkrent
in one group than others, the author fbund that the signiGcance level declined as the
managerial ownership level increased (Kim, 1998).
As can be seen from the above studies, the majority of the literature that attempts to
test the agency Gieory has fbcused on how monitoring and/or incenGves miGgate this
conflict, which, in turn, will decrease agency cost, and therefbre, reduce the extent of the
decrease of Grm value. Until recenGy, not much research has been done to idenGfy
which variables are actually controlled differently by managers of difkrent ownership
share and how much the actual agency cost is. However, Ang et al. (2000) provided
evidence to measure the actual agency cost using 1,708 small non-pubhcly traded
corporaGons from the NSSBF data base and fbund that agency costs are signiGcanGy
higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the Grms and are inversely related
to the manager's ownership share. In addiGon, the authors fbund that agency costs
increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders. The authors menGoned in their
paper that the above Gndings were possible because of the infbrmaGon about the sole
owner-manager Grms, where the Grm is 100 percent owned and managed with no outside
equity obtained through the database.
In the fbllowing secGon, expense preference theory, which will be used as evidence in
selecting the variables controlled differenGy based on difkrent ownership share, will be
examined. These variables will be later used to determine the signiGcant variables. The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
it%iuiLainyx;w)ction{ff(dia{)ter1\vois oi^anized as follows: 1) Expense preference ±eory
and past literature will be introduced; 2) the variables suggested by expense pre&rence
theory will be analyzed; and 3) some characteristics about small restaurant businesses
will be analyzed.

IbqxnseIhe6%enoeTbeory
The basic behavioral assumption that underlies the agency theory is that all
individuals are assumed to choose actions that maximize their own personal welfare and
that agency relationship occurs when th ae is a separation between ownership and control
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These two assunqrtions are the same &r a theory called the
expense pre6rence theory, whuansioiarwagfaireiü doesi&ot have a neutral attitude towards
costs, as developed by Williamson (1963). Erqpcnse preference theory is one of the
postclassical substitute theories that attack the standard assumption of profit
maximization (Hannan & Mavinga, 1980). It is commonly described in the industrial
organization literature maintaining that management in which ownership is separate from
control will employ an input mix that deviates 6om the cost-minimizing input mix (Dor
et al, 1997). In other words, "expense preference" refers to the tendency of managers to
spend more on perquisites than profit maximizing would dictate (Carter, 1991).
Williamson (1963), in his paper, "Managerial discretion and business behavior," explains
that management does not have a neutral attitude towards costs. He asserts that directly
or indirectly, certain classes of expenditure have positive values associated with them,
such as stafT expense, expenditure for emoluments, and funds available for discretionary
investment. Therefore, managers of Grms, where ownership is separate horn control, will

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18
spend more than the cost-minimizing amount on certain inputs for vdiich they have a
preference (Dor et al, 1997).
Research in expense pre&rence theory has focused particularly on regulated 6rms
and commercial banks, because the non-pro6t-maximizing actions are most likely to be
manifest under imperfect product market structure (Scott et al, 1988). For example, in
the electric utilities industry, CEOs (managers) often maximize their own expected
utility: this utility function contains a varied of goals such as health, security, power,
prestige, influence, and the welfare o f others (Mixon, 2001). Thus, utility-maximizing
CEOs (managers) have incentives to increase the size and duration o f all job-related
pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources of income/utility (DeAlessi, 1974).
Evidence from Past Literature
Many studies have been conducted to test the expense preference theory, especially in
the banking industry and savings and loan industry. Hannan and Mavinga (1980) tested a
model by using more detailed information on the dispersion of ownership and on other
characteristics of a large number of individual banking firms. Consistent widi the
implications o f expense preference behavior, their study showed that manger-controlled
banks spend more on items likely to be preferred by mangers than do owner-controlled
banks in similar situations. Another study done by Carter and Stove (1991) examined the
relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of saving
and loan associations, vdiich had recently converted to stock organizations. While their
study confirmed the other previous studies, which supported the convergence of interests
hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment
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hypothesis (management acts in its own interest), the authors found that it is conditional
on the magnitude of m aniem ent ownership in the Srm.
Outside the banking industry, Dor et al (1997) gathered evidence from the hospital
industry. Some\\iiat different from the owner-manager relationship, the authors
examined the relationship between contract managers and salaried managers. The
authors explained that because contract managers must strive to improve Gnancial
performance under threat that the board of trustees will terminate their contract, they have
every incentive to employ the iiqmts at cost-minimizing levels. In other words, these
managers are not likely to exhibit expense preference behavior, or at least, are less likely
to exhibit such behavior than managers having more conventional incentives (Dor et al,
1997). Although their test results showed that contract managers do not f^ppear to be cost
minimizers, they tend to exhibit lower expense preference behavior than salaried
managers.
Finally, a study done by Achampong and Zemedkun (1995) examined the role of
managerial self-interest in the merger m arket The authors hypothesized that managers
are apt to increase their own discretionary spending and reduce risk to their career, often
at the expense of the firm 's shareholders. Therefore, by testing a total of 800 Grms over
the decade of the 1980s and selecting manager-preferred cost variables (insider
ownership ratio, retained earnings ratio, excess stafGng), the authors found that selfinterest is a significant motivating factor in corporate managers' merger decisions
(Achampong and Zemedkun, 1995).
As demonstrated in the literature, agency theory and expense pre&rence theory are
similar in that the separation of ownership and management serves as the base of the
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conflict and that all individuals are assumed to choose actions that maximize their own
personal wel6re. While agency theory focuses more on the external structure of the
relationship between the agent and the principal, expense preference theory focuses more
on the internal behavior and the actual decision making of the agent. The following
section will provide some expense-preferred variables, which have been used in the
previous studies.
Manaper-preferred Cost Items
In order to capture the expense preference behavior, difkrent measurements were
used in past literature. Following are some of the expenditure categories used in previous
literature. The first element of the preferred expenditure category is related to labor.
fagxMsioM

This is an activity that offers positive rewards, since promotional

opportunities within a Gxed-sized Grm are limited. The incentive to expand staff not
only is an indirect means to the attainment of salary, but it is a source of security,
power, status, prestige, and professional achievements. (Williamson, 1963, p. 1034)
Many studies have measured this expenditure differently. For example, Williamson
(1963) used estimated costs of general administrative and selling expenses as the
measurement. In the manufacturing industry, Ferris et al (1998) examined the effect of
long-term performance plans on managerial decision making and use labor costs, which
can be signiGcantly controlled by management as one of the variables. Due to the lack of
labor cost data the authors used the number of employees standardized by the value of the
Grm's total assets. As discussed in the study, management that adopts long-term
performance plans seeks to lower the labor costs associated with production through a
reduction in the size of its workforce, hence increasing net income and higher proGt
margin. Another study by Achampong and Zemedkun (1995) examined the role of
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managerial self-interest in the merger market. The authors used excess stafGng as one o f
the manager-preferred cost items and calculated it as the ratio of salary expenditures to
total assets. Finally, Dor et al (1997) deGned labor costs (wz^es) as total labor expenses
on hospital staff divided by Gdl-time-equivalent employees.
The second element of the preferred expenditure category is related to perquisites.
Williamson (1963) used the term "emoluments," which is a broader concept than
perquisites, deGned as the following:
EmoZumewtr

This refers to the GacGon of managerial salaries and perquisites that

are dismeGonary. That is, emoluments represent rewards, which, if removed, would
not cause the manager to seek other employment The management would normally
prefer to take these emoluments as salary rather than Eis perquisites of ofGce since,
taken as salary there are no restiicGons on Gie way in which they are spent, while, if
withdrawn as corporate personal consumpGon (such as expense accounts, execuGve
services, ofGce suites, etc.), there are speciGc limitaGons on the ways these can be
eiyoyed. However, there are two consideraGons that make perquisites attracGve.
First, for tax purposes it may be advantageous to withdraw some part o f discreGonary
funds as perquisites rather than salary. Second, perquisites are much less visible
rewards to the management than salary and hence are less likely to provoke
stockholder or labor dissaGsfacGon. (Williamson, 1963, p. 1035).

In order to measure emoluments, Williamson (1963) in his model disclosed that the
Grm will absorb some amount of actual proGts as emoluments. The author indicated
"proGts" as a source of discreGon and deGned discreGonary proGts as the difference
between actual proGts and minimum proGts demanded. Although it was noted in the
study that the Gndii^s and the evidence presented were clearly suggesGve rather than
deGniGve, the study does suggest that reported proGts are reduced by absorbii^ some
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GacGon of actual proGts in executive salaries and possibly in perquisites of a variety of
sorts.
Other than expansion o f stafF and emoluments, menGoned by WilGams, Ferns et al
(1998), suggested that selling and general and administradve expenses are direcGy
controllable by management, and therefore any proGtability can be driven by a reducGon
in these expenses. The authors, however, failed to observe any evidence o f improvement
in total sales, total asset turnover or the management of long-term debt but did Gnd that
management seeks to enhance the Grm's proGt margin by reducing the cost of goods
sold. Also research & development and/or advertising expenses were examined as
essential discreGonary expaises by the authors, although they found no evidence that
managers reduced these expenses.
The following section will discuss agency theory research in Gie restaurant industry,
will be introduced. In addiGon, some charactensGcs and agency relaGonships related to
the small Grms will be discussed.

Agency Theory literature in the Restaurant Industry
Most of the irntial research done in the restaurant industry concerning agency theory
focused on the Ganchisor (the principal) and the Ganchisee (the agent) relaGonship. As
opposed to the resource scarcity argument that suggests that growth is the primary reason
that Grms begin to Ganchise, some researchers (Brickley & Dark 1987; Lafontaine, 1992)
posited that Ganchising eases agency problems and the associated monitoring costs of
mulG-unit operaGons (Castrc^ovanni & JusGs, 2002). As noted by Combs and Ketchner
(1999), the advantage o f Ganchising is that by transforming ouGet managers into owners.
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Ganchising induces Ganchisees to maximize outlet proGts and greatly reduces the need
G)r direct monitoiii^ by the Ganchisor.
This research trend Gxiusing on the issue of %ency theory and Ganchising also
appGes to die relaGonship between the owner and the manager in the unit level. As
previously suggested, the relaGonship between managerial ownership as a form of
incenGve and company performance o f the restaurant has been one o f the major issues
that have been examined. For example, Kim (1998) examined the relaGonship of
managerial ownership and Grm performance using 224 observaGons Gom 146 restaurant
Grms between the penod of 1995 and 1996. Controlling for Grm size and Price/Eamings
raGo and using various performance measures Gom asset uGlizaGon to stock return, the
study found a signiGcant posiGve associaGon between managerial ownership and all of
the proGtability and operating efficiency measures (Kim, 1998).
Deqoite the awareness of pubGcly traded mulG-chain restaurants, it is a generaHy
accepted fact that the restaurant industry is stGl dominated by the smaH mom and pop
restaurant Grms. However, mainly due to the lack of available data, the amount of
research is limited. In deGning a "smaG Grm," there can be many deGniGons, but the
U.S. Government Printing OfGce's (USGPO) designaGon for a smaU Grms is one with
fewer than 500 employees. These Grms provide 53% of employment in the U.S., produce
47% of total sales revenues, comprise over 95% of the total number o f Grms, and are
responsible for most of the employment growth in recent years (USGPO, 1996).
One of the distinct charactensGcs o f smaG Grms is that most o f these Grms are famüy
businesses (Handlo", 1989) and as Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed, fannly- controGed
businesses are expected to be more efGcient than professionaGy run Grms because the
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costs of monitoring are less in a 6mily-controUed Grm. However, on the other hand, as
Ang et al (2000) discussed, owners o f small Grms typically lack Gnancial sophisGcaGon
and may not be capable o f performing efGcient monitoring. In either case, it is obvious
that this kature affects the company's performance and therefore will also be considered
in this study.

Chapter Summary
This chapter examined the literature regardh% the organizaGon of the Grm and the
basic agency relaGonships therein. AddiGonally, the behavior of managers was examined
in the context of expense preference theory. Expense preference theory states that when
there is a conflict between the manager and the owner, managers (depending on Goeir
ownership share) will behave in a way (making manager-preferred decisions) that will
increase their utility; this, in turn, will lead to a decrease in Grm value, as stated by
agency theory.
Utilizing the agency theory and expense preference theory discussed in chapter two,
chapter three will discuss the hypotheses to be tested and the variables used in those tests.
AddiGonally, the next chzq)ter will detail the data sample and methodology employed.
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CHAPTERS

METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Introduction
Based upon the agency theory literature discussed in the previous chapter, this
chapter will explain the data used and methodology employed to test die cost
management preference o f small restaurant Grms. The Grst part of the chapter will
discuss the hypotheses to be tested. The next seCGon will describe in detail the
methodology to be anployed. The data set used in this study will then be discussed,
followed by an explanation of the variables used in the statistical tests.

Hypotheses Testing
The alternative hypotheses shown below will be tested. The results and hypotheses
tested will provide in s is ts as to whether the ownership level of primary owner, Amilyowned factor, and management type affect the size of sta% cost o f doing business and
overall proGtability o f a Grm.

Hi: The proGtability of a Grm is different among the groups depending on type of
management, level of ownership by primary owner, and family-owned factor.

25
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HzA: Size of stafF is different among the groups dependh% on the type of
management, level o f ownership by primary owner and family-owned Actor.
HzB: Cost of doing business is difkrent among the groups depending on the type of
management, level of ownership by primary owner and Amily-owned factor.

First, the above hypoGieses will be tested for a three-way intoaction efkcL If such
an effect is found, the two-way interacGon or individual main effects will not be tested
separately. However, if th ae is no three-way interacGon efkct, two way interacGon and
main effects will be tested. Hi hypothesis will be tested using multiple analysis of
variance (MANOVA), which will be discussed in the next secGoiL H%Aand Hza will be
tested using three-way analysis of variance. As menGoned in the previous chapters, it is
eaqiected that cost of doing business and size o f stafF are smallest for Grms ^ ^ c h are 100
percent owned by primary single-family owners and when the manager is also the owner
of the Grm.
The third and Arth hypotheses to be tested are the relaGonship between the dependent
variables and Gie independent variables. This test will be conducted using mulGple
regression, and the hypotheses are summarized as below:

Ha*: There is a negaGve linear relaGonship between size o f stafF and the percentage of
primary owner, management type and family-owned factor;
Hag: There is a negative linear relaGonship between cost of doing business and the
percentage of primary owner, management type and family-owned factor;
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H#: There is a posiGve linear relaGonship between the dependent variables (ROE,
ROA, ROS, Gnancial leverage, asset utilizaGon) and the independent variables
(percentage of primary owner, management type and fannly-owned factor).

StatisGcal Methods Used
In order to exanune the relaGonship of ownership structure and the variables
discussed in the previous diapters, this study will use two different staGsGcal procedures.
The multiple analysis o f variance test and ordinary least squares regression models are
discussed in the fbUowing secGons.
Analysis of Variance Tests
The analysis of variance test is used to examine the mean differences among the
groiQ)s studied. Two difkrent kinds o f mulGple analysis of variance tests, the three-way
ANOVA test and the mulGvariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) wUl be used in this
study. These tests will be used to determine whether type of management, Annly-owned
Actor and ownership of primary owner of the Grm will have an efkct on the dependent
variable(s). This design will make it possible to determine wheGier all three factors
joindy affect the dependent variable(s) in some way. Compared to using a one-way
ANOVA test and an independent t-test separately, this test will make it possible to
examine the interacGon between all the factors that are to be considered. For example,
according to agency theory and expense-prefisrence theory, it is expected that the cost of
doing business will be the lowest for Grms when the primary owner owns 100 percent of
the ownership, Wien the Grm is owned by a single Amily and also when the Grm is
operated by the owner. However, running an independent t-test and a one-way ANOVA
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test will only examine these Aree factors separately. Conducting a mulGple analysis o f
variance (three-way ANOVA / MANOVA) makes it possible to examine whether the
relaGonship between the cost of doii% business and ownership percent%e is affected by
Gie type of management and family-owned factor. The three factors to considered in the
test are management type (owner-man^er Grm/outside manager Grm), family-owned
Actor (single family owns more than 50 percent of Grm/less than 50 percent of Grm) and
ownership perc^tEge (primary owner owns 100 percent of Grm/more than 50
percent/owns 50 percent/less than 50 percent).
Figure 1 shows the research model used in this study. In addiGon, the number of
sources of variance in the variance test is eight, and the e i^ t sources of variaGons are
shown in Figure 2.

Cost of Doing
Business

Management Type

Size of Staff

Ownership Percent
by Primary Owner

Five Accounting
RaGos

Family-owned
Factor

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables

Figure 1. RelaGonship of dependent variables and independent variables.
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MANAGEMENT TYPE

(A)

FAMILY OWNERSHIP

(B)

OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE (C)

t Main Effects
—

First Order InteracGons

MANAGEMENT TYPExFAMILY OWNERSHIP

I

MANAGEMENT TYPExOWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE
FAMILY OWNERSmPxOWNERSmP PERCENTAGE
MANAGEMENT TYPExFAMILY OWNERSHIPxOWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE
WITHIN CELLS (ERROR)

Figure 2. Sources of variance.

As discussed earlier, the main effects, Which are management type, family and
ownership, will be tested to determine if the underlying populaGon level means are
difkrent for the factors under consideraGon. The interacGon effect, deGned as a joint
efkct of the independent variables, is assessed by examining the pattern of means for the
two Actors combined. Finally, the three-way interacGon examines whether the patterns
of means for any two factors difkrs across the levels of the third factor (Stevens, 1999).
The major difference between three-way ANOVA and MANOVA depends on the
number of dependent vanables and their correlaGon. Compared to using a univariate test
(in this case, three-way ANOVA) for each individual dependent variable, this test wiU
make it possible to examine the interacGon between all the independent factors which
need to be considered and will also reGect any correlaGons among the dependent
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vanables, The reason Giat MANOVA is preferable to such separate univariate analysis
was summarized by Stevens (1999) as foGows:
1) The univariate analyses, cspeciaGy for a moderate or large number o f dependent
variables, aGow the overaG type one error rate to go completely out of control;
2) The univariate ANOVA ignores important inArmation, such as the correlations
among the dependent measures, Wiereas the multivariate tests incorporate these
correlations into the test;
3) The univariate tests many not show the groups to be signiGcanGy different on any
of the variables, because of smaG unreliable differences on each o f the variables.
However, if measures are considered joindy (as in MANOVA), there may be
signiGcant differences; and,
4) If treatment affects the dependent variables in difkient ways, and the dependent
variables are at least moderately correlated within groiqis, the m u lti\^ a te approach
will be quite powerGil and can detect differences that the univariate tests cannot

In order to determine whether there is a signiGcant correlation among the dependent
variables, Bartelett's test far sphericity wiG be used. As noted by Hair, Anderson,
Tatham and Black (1995), this test is the most widely used test to examine the correlation
among aG dependent variables and make it possible to detect any signiGcant correlation
among the variables. However, a common problem encountered in using MANOVA is
the tendency of including aG dependent variables without a sound conceptual or
theoretical basis (Hair et al., 1995). This indicates the problem o f including one of the
dependent variables without a solid rationale and then drawing incorrect conclusions
about the set as a whole. It is for this reason that two variance tests (three-way ANOVA
and MANOVA) are conducted separately in this research. The dependent variables (size
of staff" and cost of doing business) wGl be tested by the three-way ANOVA test. The
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remainder of the Gve dependent variables, which mainly represent the proGtabGity of the
Grm, will be tested by using MANOVA.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
In order to identify the degree o f impact of ownership structure, a multq)le regression
model WU be employed. For each dependent variable, independent variable(s), which
are ownership percentage o f pim ary owner, management type and family-owned Actor,
will be used to examine the reAGonship. Management type and family-owned Actor will
be recoded into 0 or 1 for use in the regression model. By employing a regression model,
the signiGcance and the signs o f the independent variables can be tested.

DaA Source and Sample CollecGon
The Gnancial data used in Giis study were obtained Gom The 1998 Survey of
Small Business Finances (SSBF), formerly known as the NaGonal Survey of Small
Business Finances (NSSBF), which is conducted by the Board of Governors o f the
Federal Reserve System (FRS) with the help of the NaGonal Opinion Research Center
(NORC) at the University of Chicago. The 1998 survey is Gie third time that Gnancial
inArmaGon Ar businesses with Awer than 500 employees has been coUected by the FRS
and are Ae most recendy available data. The survey method was a 40-minute telephone
interview conducted Gom November 1998 through January 2001. The iniGal sample
includes 3,561 Grms that represent ^proxim alely 5 million small nonArm, nonGnancial
business operating m Ae U.S. wiA completed mterviews (response rate 33%) of Ae
survey.
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Among these samples, this study will use Ae data of the eating and drinking Grms
classiGed by primary SIC code 58 (Eating and Drinking places), Which results m 171
Grms. The sample includes Gnancial data A r Aese non-publicly-traded companies A r
Gscal year 1998.
Among these 171 Grms, 56 Grms Wiich are sole proprietorships and 25 Grms which
are partnerships, LLPs, or LLCs were excluded Gom Ae data seL This exclusion is due
A the fact that most sole proprietorships and partnerships diGer in terms of tax issues
and/or liabiGGes compared A corporaGons. A addiGon, three samples that did not have a
value Ar the tested variables were eliminated. Thus, the Gnal data set Ataled 87 Grms.

Measurement o f Variables
Expansion o f Staff
As examined m the expense-preference theory and agency theory, excess use of stafT
is one of Ae most important variables over which managers have direct control.
According A Ae data, when the primary owner owns 100 percent of the Grm, sales per
employee raGo shows that Grms operated by owner-manger Grms are higher than Grms
managed by outside-manager Grms are. A addiGon, as Ae level of ownersAp decreased,
sales per employee raGo decreased. This result agrees wiA agency theory and expense
preArence Aeory, as discussed A chapter two. AlAough many ways have been
suggested A measure this vanable m Ae Gterature, due A Ae availability of Ae data, this
study will use Ae number of employees standardized by Ae value of the Grm's total
assets.
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Cost of Dome Business
Operating expenses, selling, and general and administrative expenses have been
mentioned in previous studies as directly controllable by management As noted earlier,
excessive expense on perquisites and other nonessentials incurred by managers should be
reflected in this variable. In Figure 3, it can be seen that the average expense-to-saies
ratio for the samples are much higher for the sample firms operated by outside-managers
compared to owner-managers. Also, the ratio is higher for Grms when the primary owner
has less than 100 percent of the ownership. These two Ggures in Figure 3 indicate that
there is a relationship between the type of ownership and the level of ownership with the
cost of doing business. Due to the availability of the data, the total cost of doing business
to the annual sales ratio will be used. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the total cost of doing
business is the sum of "cost of goods sold" and "selling and administrative expenses."
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I
§

0 « w r Manager

Type of Manager

100%

L s s then 100%

% o f ownership by prim ary ow n er

Figure 3. Cost of doing business to sales ratio by ownership structure for a sample of 87
small corporations.
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Accountme Ratios
Some of the previously used accounting ratios, such as return on equity (ROE) and
return on assets (ROA), will also be used to compare the proGtability o f the sample
companies. However, this use raise the quesGon of whether or not these raGos direcGy
reGect the managerial spending behavior associated with agency theory. For example, an
increase in ROE can result from either a singular or a combined increase in Gie ROA,
earnings leverage or capital structure leverage (Ingram, 1994). Also, proGt margin is net
income divided by revenue, which means that either increasing sales, or reducing costs,
or a combinaGon of these two will have an efkct on the raGo. It cannot be assumed that
Gns raGo itself direcGy reGects the underlying behavioral assumpGon involved in the
agency theory. Therefore, in order to test the decision-making process, Giese raGos wiU
be decomposed as follows:
Kefwn on assets (RCM). ROA is an indicator of proGtability, which is determined by
dividing net income G)r the past 12 months by total average assets. The result is shown
as a percentage. ROA can be decomposed into return on sales (net income/sales)
mulGplied by asset utilizaGon (sales/assets).
on egmty

ROE is an indicator of proGtability, which is determined by

dividing net income for the past 12 months by common stockholder equity (ar^usted for
stock splits). The result is shown as a percentage. Investors use ROE as a measure of
how a company is using its money. ROE may be decomposed into ROA mulGplied by
Gnancial leverage (total assets/total equity).
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ChfgAer Summary
This chapter has presented the hypo&eses to be tested in this study and the sources of
data. This research uses a sample of 87 small restaurant Grms and utilizes MANOVA
and regression models to test the Garegoing hypotheses. The chapter also explained how
the key variables were to be rationalized. The next chrqrter will discuss the results of the
StatisGcal tests.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter will present the results o f the statistical methods enployed and analyze
them. This chapter is organized as G)llows. The first section presents descriptive
statistics 6 r the sample. The next sections will present the results of the three way
ANOVA, MANOVA and multiple regression models. Conclusions are discussed at the
end of the chapter.

Descriptive Analysis
In order to better assess the data, a descriptive analysis of the 87 Grms was conducted.
The descripGve staGsGcs were based on attributes related to the Grm, size o f staff and
operaGon variables such as revenues and expenses.
Firm-related
According to Table 1 and the Gequency test for the sangles, the distribuGon o f the
samples regarding the Grm's age were normal, ranging Gom one year to 55 years.
Although over 60 percent of the Grms in the study have been in business for 15 years or
less, 16 of the Grms had been in business over 25 years. Among these 16 Grms, 14 Grms
are family-owned businesses, indicating one o f the m ^or charactensGcs of successful

36
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small confiâmes. As mentioned in previous ckqiters, the majority of the Grms (67
Grms) in this study are owned and managed by the same person (owner-manager Grms)
while 20 Grms are managed by a paid manager (outside-manager Grm).

Table 1 Firm-related DescripGve StaGsGcs for 87 Small Restaurant Firms
No. Firms Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std.
DeviaGon

Owner expenenoe

87

2.00

54.00

20.9655

11.51384

Age of Grm in years

87

1.00

55.00

15.3563

11.18655

Ownership share o f
principal owner

87

10.00

100.00

672414 27.04603

StAff-related

As shown in Table 2, the number of working owners ranged from 0 to 5, compared to
the range of the actual owners which ranged Gom 1 to 60. It should be noted, however,
that the number o f working owners does not necessarily indicate the number of working
pn/Mory owners. As menGoned in chapter one, the primary owner is deGned as an owner
who has the largest ownership share and Gdl Gnancial decision-making authonty.
Therefare, it should be noted that the type of management (owner-manager or outsidemanager) used throughout this research is based on primary owners and not actual
owners or working owners. Finally, the number of non-owner employees ranged Gom 0
to 450, where the mean value was approximately 55.
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Table 2 StaG-related DescripGve StaGsGcs for 87 SmaU Restaurant Firms
No. Firms Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std.
DeviaGon

1.4253

.78699

Number of woddng owners

87

.00

5.00

Number of non-owner
Employees

87

.00

450.00

55.2184 73.48254

Number of owners

87

1.00

60.00

2.8621

6.49181

OperaGon-related
The variables were distributed normally except G r two outliers. As can be seen from
Table 3, total sales far the current year ranged Gom zg^iroximately $40,000 to $32
million. However, one Grm had more than $32 milGon in sales and the remainders were
all below $10 mdlion. This Grm also reported an approximate $32 milGon in the cost of
doing business, while die rest of the Grms ranged Gnm $40,000 to $9 million. The
discussion of outliers that were eliminated will be described in the next secGon. The
reported proGt variable ranged Gom negaGve one million dollars through approximately
1.9 million doUars. Among the 87 Grms examined, 12 Grms had reported a negaGve
proGt and only one Grm reported a 1.9 million dollar proGt. The m ^onty o f the Grms
reported proGts o f less than one milGon. Also, it was found Giat among the 13 Grms
which reported a negaGve proGt for the current Gscal year, six Grms were start-up
businesses in just then Grst or second year of business.
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Table 3 OperaGon-related DescripGve StaGsGcs 6)r 87 Small Restaurant Firms
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. DeviaGon

Reported equity

87

-2,556,996

8,283,072

274,266

1,137,593

Total sales

87

40,857

32,811262

1,949,004

3,810,328

Total cost of doing
Business

87

40,000

32,197,013

1,775,556

3,763,617

Reported proGt

87

-1,578,199

1,965,604

191,137

358,527

Total assets

87

11,500

11,736,077

659,970

1,407,075

Total liabiGGes

87

0

3,870,179

385,704

633,161

Note: Amounts presented in dollars.

Analysis and ImpGcaGons
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure
After conducting an assumpGon check for the samples, an ANOVA test was
conducted. As menGoned in chzqiter three, the three factors which were considered in the
test were type of management (MGMT), percentage of ownership (OWNERSHIP) and
Gmnly-owned factor (FAMILY). A total of 87 Grms were examined. The test was
conducted twice including and excluding the outher menGoned in Gie previous secGon.
Although the outlier inGuenced the mean value, it did not change the result o f the
signiGcance tests. Therefore, the outUers are included in the Gnal result. It should be
noted that the major focus is the case where the primary owner (single &mily) owns 100
percent of the Grm and also operates the Grm. As discussed earlier, the true existence of
agency costs can be detected compared to this case, where there is theoreGcally no
agency cosL
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In order to determine whether the dependent variables were correlated, Bartelett's test
for sphericity was used. According to the test, Gve dependent variables ROE, ROA,
ROS, Gnancial leverage, and asset utilizaGon, which mainly represents proGtabiGty, did
show a signiGcant degree of intercorrelaGon (p<0.001), as expected. There&re, it is
reasonable to conclude that these Gve dependent variables can be examined using
MANOVA.
Table 4 shows the results of the MANOVA test for proGtabiGty. The interacGon
efkct should be tested before examining the main e fk c t As can be seen Gom Table 4
there is a signiGcant interacGon efk ct between MGMT and OWNERSHIP and between
FAMILY and OWNERSHIP.
FXMZLT aW AA3MT

According to Table 4, although there is no overall signiGcant

interacGon between the FAMILY and MGMT factor, ROE does show a signiGcant
difkrence between these two factors. This result means that although these two factors do
not afkct the overaU proGtabiGty measurements which were tested, it does have an efkct
on ROE. Figure 4 confirms this conclusion. Whether the Grm was an owner-manager
Grm or an outside-manager Grm, ROE was higher for single-family-owned Grms than for
non-single-famdy owned Grms. A quesGon arises, that when examining within the
single-kmily Grms only, outside-manager Grms had a higher ROE than owner-manager
Grms, which is an opposite finding to what was predicted. This result might be due to
sampling error or the fact that measurement of equity could be problemaGc. The sample
included negaGve equity numbers, which could be signiGcanGy different Gom posiGve
ROE Ggures.
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Table 4 MANOVA Summary Table: Interaction ESect
MANOVA
.
Approx. F
Source of variaGon

FAMILY/MGMT

Value

0.121

ROE
ROA
ROS
Financial leverage
Asset uGlizaGon
0.227
MGMT/OWNERSHIP
ROE
ROA
ROS
Financial leverage
Asset UtilizaGon
FAMILY / OWNERSHIP 0.455
ROE
ROA
ROS
Financial leverage
Asset UtilizaGon

Degrees of

^ TT . . . Between WiGiin
MulGvanate Umvanate
groiq) group
1.928

5

70

5

72

10

142

5.763
0232
2.051
0.300
2.025
3.271
2.153
1.064
2.471
0277
1.194
4.179
0.610
0.120
2.112
14.062
0.593

Sig.

0.101
0.019**
0.632
0.156
0.585
0.159
0.010***
0.101
0.370
0.000***
0.842
0.318
0.000***
0.546
0.887
0.128
0.000***
0.555

Note. The test is based on Pillai's Trace, which is genera).; used when sample size
decreases, unequal cell size appears, or homogeneity o f covariance is violated (Hair et al.,
1995).
MGMT = Type o f management factor; FAMEY = Owned by single family factor;
OWNERSinP = Percentage of ownership 6 ctor.
**SigniGcant at 95%; ***SigniGcant at 99%.
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Figure 4 Mean score o f ROE by management type and family-owned &ctor.

jwRjükfTdPïdCPjfTVlEf&SüHZlP

ftwelSist sigrufïcxmt interaction effect :fbimdanM)iy;tlie

tfunee factCKTS(lu9eiwsse(liiitiuGstiMi)r\v%Lsl)et3V(x;n IvfOAdT arid ())&TSrE]RJSH]F. TTatde^l
shows that there is a significant difkrence in proût margin, depending on the level of
ownership percentage and management type; Figure 5 shows this relationship. As can be
seen 6 om the Figure 5, the proGt margin decreases as the level of ownership decreases
with owner-manager firms. However, this jGnding is not same for outside-manager Gims.
Comparing only the case where primary owner owns 100 percent o f the Grm, ROS is
higher for owner-manager Grms than for outside-manager Grms and the opposite when
ownership is less than 50 percent

FXMZLF awf OlfWEÆSHZP The second interacGon effect found was between
FAMILY and OWNERSHIP factors, which signiGcanGy affect Gnancial leverage. As
menGoned in ch u ter three, this variable is measured by total assets divided by total
equity. Results indicate that Gnancial leverage for single-family Grms and non-single
family Grms is different depending on the level of ownership. As it can be seen Gom
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ûgure 6, there were no Grms that were 100 percent owned by primary owner which were
non-single-hamily-owned Grms. When Gwusing only on the single-fiamily-owned case, it
can be seen that as the ownership percentage decreases, Gnancial leverage also decreases.
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Figure 5 Mean score o f ROS by management type and ownership percentage.
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Figure 6 Mean score o f Gnancial leverage by family-owned factor and ownership
percentage.
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Table 5 shows the results of the three-way ANOVA test The Grst item that should be
examined is whether an interaction exists among the diree 6 ctors discussed. As
discussed in chapter three, one cannot effectively assess the individual &ctors, unless it
can be confirmed that there is no interaction among the factors beh% discussed.

Table 5 Results of Three-way ANOVA Test
Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Dependent Variable: Cost o f Doing Business
FAMILY OWNERSHIP

1.021

1

1.021

9.947

.002***

OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE

.985

3

.328

3.202

.028**

283

2.754

.048**

MANAGEMENT TYPE /
OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE

"

Dependent Variable: Size of Staff
7.398EMANAGEMENT TYPE /
? n op n?
?
3.267
.026**
08
OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE
Notes: FAMLY = Owned by single family factor; OWNERSHIP = Percentage of
ownership &ctor; MGMT = Type o f management 6 ctor;
**SigniGcant at 95%, *** SigniGcant at 99%

Cost

Doing Rufinass

As can be seen Gom the top panel of Table 5, there is an

interacGon between type of management (MGMT) and percentage of ownership
(OWNERSHIP), which indicates that the relaGonship between cost of doing business and
percentage o f ownership is not the same for owner-managed Grms and outside managed
Grms. Figure 7 confirms the existence of this interacGon eGect. Figure 7 shows that
while the cost of doing business was lowest for owner-managed Grms when the manager
owned 100 percent of the Grm, this was not true for outside-manager firms. The cost of
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doing business was higher &r Grms when the primary owner owned 100 percent of the
Grm than Grms when the primary owner owned less than 100 percent of the Grm. On the
other hand, no interacGon was detected between FAMILY and MGMT or FAMILY and
OWNERSHIP. The FAMILY Gictor was signiGcant at the 99 percent level, indicating
that this 6 ctor is a main efGsct and that it is possible to rqect the null hypothesis diat cost
of doing business is the same for the difkrent groups in the factors. Figure 8 shows that
the main efk ct of FAMILY does not have any interacGon, depending on the level of
ownership. This result leads support to the noGon that as the level o f ownership by
primary owner decreases, cost of doing business wras signiGcanGy higher for non-siogle
Amily Grms than for single family owned Grms at all levels o f ownership.

-1.2

«

e•
firm

-to o

Figure 7 Mean score o f cost of doii% business by type of management and ownership
percentage.
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Figure 8 Mean score o f cost of doing business by family owned factor and ownership
percentage.

S^izg q / " S i z e o f staff is a variable which was tested based on the expensepreference theory. As discussed in chapter three, the size of staff is one o f die variables
over which managers are assumed to have direct control. Table 5 indicated that there is
an interaction efGxt from the two Actors which are MGMT and OWNERSHIP. Figure 9
conGrms this interaction efkcL While the mean score for size of staff increases A r
owner-manager Grms, when the level of ownership decreases, it is somewhat the opposite
for outside-manger Grms. However, comparing the two extreme cases for the two types
of manager Grms, it can be seen that size of staff was signiGcantly higher for outsidemanager Grms than for owner-manger Grms when the primary owner owned 100 percent
of die Grm.
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Figure 9 Mean score of size o f stafTby management type and ownership percentage.

Degree of Agency Cost and Ownership Structure
In this section, &e results of a regression test for each variable are shown. As
discussed earlier, ordinary least square regression will be used to determine the
coefBcient of the independent variables.
Cost q^Domg Business.

Table 6 shows the result of the regression for the variable

cost of doing business. First, the FAMILY factor, vdiich was previously identiûed as a
main efkct, was signiScant at 99 percent, indicatii^ that this factor is independently
explaining the variance o f the variable being tested. The coefBcient o f the FAMILY
variable is -0.474, indicating that the mean cost of doing business decreases an average
by 0.474 dollars when the Grm is a single-family-owned firm compared to a non-single6 mily-owned Grm. Although OWNERSHIP and MGMT &ctors were also signiGcant,
these factors will not be interpreted separately. Instead, the combined factor, which is the
MGMT / OWNERSHIP variable shows that cost of doing business decreases by -0.763
dollars for owner-manager firms as the percentage of ownership by the primary owner
increases.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48
Table 6 Regression for Cost of Doing Business

Model

Unstandardized
CoeKcients
B
Std. Error

Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta

T

Sig.
.012**

7.786E-03

.003

.562

2.568

FAMILY OWNERSHIP

-.440

.103

-.474

-4.267 .000***

MGMT

.525

232

.600

2261

.026**

-7.663E-03

.003

-.763

-2.431

.017**

OWNERSHIP

MGMT*OWNERSmP

R Square = 0.47 Adjusted R Square = 0JZ2
OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership factor; FAMILY = Owned by single family
6 ctor; MGMT = Type of management factor.
**SigniGcant at 95%; ***SigniGcant at 99%.

Bize q / " I n Table 7, the regression result for size of stafF showed a
significance level of 95 percent for the MGMT*OWNERSHIP 6 ctor. This interaction
was detected Gom the previous analysis of variance test. It is conGrmed here that this
interacGon eSect does the job of expia wng the dependent variable. It can be concluded
that the mean size of staff will decrease by -0.698 for owner-manager Grms as the
ownership level increases. This makes sense as owners with more ownership level will
hire fewer staff
Rgfum on Equity

Table 8 conGrms the previous result of the MANOVA

test, showing that no interacGon efkct exists among the independent factors. However, it
was found Gom this regression test that the family Gictor is signiGcant in explaining
ROE. According to the beta, it can be said that the mean ROE is higher by 0.448 for
single-family-owned Grms compared to non-single-family owned Grms.
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Table 7 Regression 6)r Size of StafF

Model

Unstandardized
Standardized
CoefGcients
Coe&cients
Beta
B
Std. Error

t

Sig.

OWNERSHIP

1.963E-06

.000

.346

1.440

.154

FAMILY
MGMT

-1.183E-07
1.581E-04

.000
.000

.000
.440
-.698

-.003
1.514

.998
.134
.046**

-2.877E-06
.000
MGMT / OWNERSHIP
-2.030
R Square = 0.06 Ac^usted R Square = 0.01.
MGMT = Type o f management factor; FAMILY = Owned by single-family factor;
OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership Gictor.
**SigniGcant at 95%.

Table 8 Regression for Return on Equity

Model
OWNERSHIP

Unstandardized
CoefGcients
B
Std. Error
4.386E-03

.013

Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta

t

Sig.

.046

.346

.730

.448
FAMILY
2.843
1376
2.067 .042**
MGMT
2.025
1.375
.338
1.472
.145
-.53H
MGMT/FAMILY
-2.769
1.534
-1.805
.075
R Square = 0.06 Actuated R Square = 0.009.
OWNERSHIP = Percentage o f ownership factor; FAMILY = Owned by single-fiamily
factor; MGMT = Type of management &ctor.
** SigniGcant at 95%.

Rerum 0» A s f e t s A n o t h e r indicator of proGtability is ROA As in the
previous MANOVA test, the regression test also did not show any signiGcant interaction
eGect. However, using only ROA as the dependent variable, the regression resulted in a
signiGcant main effect for family factor. The result shows that mean ROA is higher by
0.267 6)r single-family owned Grms compared to non-single-Gimily Grms.
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Table 9 Regression G)r Return on Assets (ROA)

Model
OWNERSHIP

Unstandardized
Standardized
CoefGcients
CoefGcients
B
Std. Error
Beta

t

Sig.

-2320E-03

.004

-.091

-.638

.526

FAMILY

.482

.236

.267

2.042

.045**

MGMT

-.167

.215

-.100

-.775

.441

R Square = 0.07 A<^usted R Square = 0.019.
MGMT = Type of m anaganent factor; FAMILY = Owned by single-family Gictor;
OWNERSHH* = Percentage o f ownership Gictor.
**SigniGcant at 95%.

Prq/if AAargin.

ProGt Margin was one of the two variables to explain ROA

Although Gom the MANOVA test an interacGon effect was detected between the
OWNERSHIP and MGMT 6 ctors, an interacGon effect was not detected in the
regression test. This may be due to the fact that the regression model did not account for
correlaGon among the dependent variables. However, the FAMILY factor was
signiGcanGy different at 0.05 level with a posiGve beta. This result means that singleGanily Grms will have a higher ROS compared to non-single-Gunily Grms, as predicted.

Table 10 Regression for ProGt Margin

Model
OWNERSHIP
FAMILY
MGMT

Unstandardized
CoefGcients
B
Std. Error

Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta

t

Sig.

-1.560E-03

.002

-.120

-.952

.344

.390

.100

.447

3.913

.000**

-3.025E-02

.089

-.037

-.338

.736
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EfwmcW Zewemge = Tofo/ ArseiyToW Equ/fy. As confirmed Gom the previous
MANOVA test, an interacGon effect between OWNERSHIP and FAMILY was detected
to be signiGcant. In addiGon, the beta showed a posiGve sign which means that as
ownership level increases, Gnancial leverage will increase for single-family-owned Grms
compared to non-single-family-owned firms.

Table 11 Regression for Financial Leverage

Model

Unstandardized
CoefGcients
B
Std. Error

Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta

t

Sig.

-1.365E-02

.006

-1.047

-2.219

.029**

-.169

.292

-.194

-.581

.563

MGMT

-1.091E-02

.088

-.013

-.124

.902

OWNERSHIP/FAMILY

1.259E-02

.006

1.345

2.036

.045**

OWNERSHIP
FAMILY

OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership factor; FAMLY = Owned by single family
factor; MGMT = Type of management factor.
**Signi6cant at 95%.

Chapter Summary
First, given the results of three-way ANOVA, MANOVA and simple linear
regression tests, the first two hypotheses tested can be accepted based on the test
conducted. It was found that the level of ownership, management type, and family
ownership yield signiGcant differences in cost of doing business and size of staff of the
Grm. It was found that the size of staff decreased for owner-manager Grms as the level of
ownership increased. For the cost of doing business vanable, a signiGcant difference was
found between a single-family-owned Grm and a non-single-family-owned Grm.
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AddiGonally, the results conGrmed that as the level of ownership increased for ownermanager Grms, the cost of doing business decreased.
Second, among the overall proGtabihty variables measured by ROE, ROA ROS,
asset utilizaGon and Gnancial leverage, only ROE, ROS and Gnancial leverage were
shown to be signiGcanGy difkrent depending on level of ownership, family-owned factor
and management type.
Third, Grom the regression tests, it was found that cost of doing business and size of
stafF had negaGve linear relaGonships wiGi the three independent variables tested, as
expected, therefore the two H3 null hypotheses are rejected. In addiGon, the regression
test for the proGtability variables showed sigiGGcant relaGonships for Gie family-owned
factor and the joint factor between ownersh^ and fanGly.
Overall, the results of Gie statisGcal tests tend to support the literature regarding
agency theory and cost management preferences by Grms. The next chapter will provide
Gnal conclusions and make recommendaGons for addiGonal research.
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CHAPTERS

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion of the study
The purpose of this p^per was to test cost management pre&rences of restaurant
Grms. Based on Ae agency theory literatures, it was expected that costs are controUed
diSerently by managers depending on the degree o f conflict between the agent
(managers) and the principal(s) (owners). The results of the statisGcal tests largely
support the evidence in Gie existing literature.
The issue of "conflict of interest" based on agency theory has been a topic of interest
for many researchers (Rozeff^ 1982; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; Hudson
et al., Kim et aL, 1988' Hudson et aL, 1992; Gu & Qian, 1999) and has been applied to
many industries. The mrgonty of these studies have tested the relaGonship between
managerial ownership and conyany performance in order to determine whether agency
relaGonship exists or n o t This is different G?om the previous research in that it has
attempted to identify the Grm-level cost variables that are assumed to be controlled
diGerently by agents (managers) depending on their ownership structure. In oGier words,
it was attempted to identify whether cost is controGed diGerenGy depending on the
degree of conflict that exists between the agent (managers) and the principal (owners) in
small restaurant Grms.

53
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In order to do so, this study used data Gom 87 non-publicly traded Grms (SIC code 58
for restaurants) obtained Gom the Federal Reserve Board in then 1998 Survev of Small
Business Finances. The use of this data made it possible to compare every level of
ownership structure in which a Grm is 100 percent owned and managed by a single
individual (no agency cost occurs) and in which a Grm is operated by a manager with no
equity in the Grm.
O f the seven dqiendent variables analyzed (cost of doing business, size of sta%
return on assets, return on equity, proGt margin, asset utilizaGon, and Gnancial leverage)
the cost of doing business and size of staff were examined based on expense preference
theory assuming that managers have the most direct control over these two variables. In
addiGon, Gve accounting raGos GequenGy used to measure the proGtabihty of the Grm
were selected. Indqiendent variables considered in the study were management type
(owner-manager Grm versus outside-manger Grm), family ownership (a single family
owns more than 50 percent of the Grm or less than 50 percent o f the Grm) and ownership
percentage (primary owner owns 100 percent of Gie Grm, primary ownisr owns more than
50 percent but less than 100 percent, primary owner owns 50 percent of thp Grm, primary

owner owns less than 50 percent).
The proGtabihty of the Grm variables represented in this study by ROE, ROA proGt
margin, Gnancial leverage and asset uthizaGon, was tested using mulGple analysis of
vanance (MANOVA). Among these vanables, it was found that ROE, proGt margin, and
Gnancial leverage were signiGcanGy different depending on the independent factors.
First, it was found that ROE was higher for single family-owned Grms than non-single
famhy-owned Grms as expected. Second, when the primary owner owns 100 percent of
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the Gim, ft wa ? and that proGt margin was higher for owner-manager Grms than
outside-manager Grms. Finally, it was found that as the ownership percentage decreases,
Gnancial leverage also decreased within the single fmnily-owned Grms. Therefore there
is some evidence to support the hypothesis that the proGtability of a Grm is difkrent
depending on ownership structure.
According to the analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) that was used to compare the
mean values of each group depœding on the ownership structure, it was found that cost
o f doing business was lowest for owner-managed Grms when the primary owner owned
100 percent o f the Grm. It was also found that as the level of ownership by primary
owner decreases, cost of doing business was signiGcanGy higher for non-single 6m ilyowned Grms than single family-owned Grms at all levels of ownership percentage. In
addiGon, when the primary owner owned 100 percent of the Grm, it was found that the
size of staff was signiGcanGy higha" for outside-manger Grms than owner-manager Grms.
This result tends to support the hypothesis that the cost of doing business and the size o f
staff are difkrent dqiending on ownership structure.
Ordinary least squares regression was used to test the signiGcance and the sign of the
coefGcient of the independent variables that were tested. As expected, it was found that
the cost of doing business is lower for single fannly-owned Grms compared to non-single
fannly-owned Grms. It was also found that cost o f doing business is smaUer for ownermanager Grms as the percentage o f ownership by the primary owner increases. For size
o f staff variable, it was found that the mean size o f staG"decreased for owner-manager
Grms as the ownership level increased.
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For the Gve dependent variables that were used to measure the overall proGtability, it
was found that there was a posiGve linear relaGonship between all of the Gve vanables
tested and the family-owned factor leading one to conclude that single family-owned
Grms compared to non-single fanniy-owned Grms performed better in terms of
proGtability.

RecommendaGons for Further Research
WhGe this study used two dependent variables (size of staff and cost o f doing
business) to examine whether or not cost is controlled differenüy depending on
ownership structure, it would be more meaningful if the cost of doing business variable
can be broken down into spedGc expenses. In GGs way it would be possible to examine
which speciGc cost is more directly controllable for managers of different ownership
structure. AddiGonally, the reader should be reminded that this study used only
restaurant Grms. If data is available, it would be interesting to test different sectors (for
example hotel, casino or others) within the industry or among other different industries.
Finally, while this study only considered the relaGonship between managers and
owners, other agency problems which occur in différait relaGonships, such as lender and
owner relaGonship, can also be examined. In addiGon, while this study mainly Gacused on
problems such as moral hazard, other agency problems such as inkrmaGonal asymmetry
could be examined.
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